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ABSTRACT 
Purpose: This purpose of this paper is to empirically examine the relationship between 
transparency and disclosure and firm performance. Highlighting the importance of corporate 
governance in banking sector, the paper has focused in depth over its role, level and its impact on 
performance in banking industry of Pakistan. Design/methodology/approach: The paper access this 
purpose by constructing transparency and disclosure index for the past five year 2007-2011, using 
proxies for three sub-categories which are board and management structure disclosure, ownership 
structure disclosure and financial transparency disclosure. The paper also investigated structural 
changes of T&D Index and its effect on bank financial performance over the sample of 30 banks 
operating in Pakistan. Findings: Empirical analysis results by using ordinary least square regression 
model, reveals that financial performance is positively related to the transparency and disclosure and 
their sub levels except ownership structure disclosure which has negative relation with both ROA and 
ROE. Furthermore the average T&D level in Pakistani banking sector is above average. Practical 
implications: The current research paper aims for important policy implementation to reduce 
information asymmetry and improve corporate governance and firm performance in banking sector of 
Pakistan. 
 
Keywords: Corporate Governance; Transparency & Disclosure; Financial Performance; Agency 
Theory 
 
 
 
1.  INTRODUCTION 
 
Effective disclosure of corporate governance practices leads the firm towards 
profitability and growth. Transparency and disclosure are core attributed of OECD, 1999 
reports and also regarded as most important attributes in assessing the corporate governance 
practices across the globe. Recent big collapse such as Enron or World COM reveals the poor 
standard of disclosure in their financial statements and highlighted the importance of 
disclosure aspect in body of main research stream. Transparency and disclosure coupled with 
firm performance has largely studied on developed economy but very few studies were 
conducted on the developing countries especially Pakistan where the corporate governance 
infrastructure is in transformation phase after Security Exchange Commission of Pakistan 
launched its code of corporate governance in 2002 and revised it in 2012 for betterment of 
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governance level in Pakistan. The core reason to analyze T&D practices on banking industry 
is that it requires extra regulation for efficient working and also the whole economy revolves 
around this sector. The problem in the corporate governance arises from the asymmetry 
information and agency issues between managers and shareholders. These unresolved conflict 
badly impact on firm valuation (Chi & Lin, 2000). The agency conflict is worse in economies 
having family oriented ownership structure and unfortunately major companies operating in 
Pakistan are family oriented firms. This set basic derive for the conduction of research that 
access the level of disclosure among companies and also highlight its impact on firm 
performance. Lang and Lundolm, (1993) claim that disclosure of corporate practices reduced 
this asymmetry of information and enables shareholders to effectively monitor management 
decision and firm performance. The current study aims for important policy implementation 
to reduce information asymmetry and improve corporate governance and firm performance in 
banking sector of Pakistan. 
The purpose of the paper is to analyze the transparency and disclosure level in Pakistani 
banking industries and also determine their impact on financial performance of the banking 
sector. Empirical analysis has carried out using OLS multiple regression models over the 
sample of 30 banks for period of five year (2007-2011). Finding of the paper reveals that 
average level of disclosure in Pakistan is almost 79 % which is quite impressive and 
furthermore the statistical result also determined that T&D index along with its two sub level 
is significantly positively related to the financial performance indicators except ownership 
structure disclosure which is negative related to the ROA & ROE. 
The reminder of the paper is structured as follows. The next section provides brief 
overview of literature on transparency and disclosure and corporate governance infrastructure 
and its implication on Pakistani banking sector. This is followed by development of 
theoretical model and study hypothesis. The subsequent sections present the methodology, 
discussion and outcome of the study.  
 
 
2.  LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
 The large research has been conducted to assess the impact of corporate governance 
on firm performance for underdeveloped and developed markets. Transparent and value free 
disclosure of information is the key aspect of corporate governance in any organization. This 
transparent financial disclosure beside so many advantages attracts prospect investors to 
finance the investing opportunities. The importance of disclosure is substantively important to 
the investor because it reveal the common understanding about the organization 
understanding its structure, operations and processes. Shielfer & Vishny (1997) , John & 
Senbet (1998) and Hermalin & Weisbach, (2003) conduct studies on this area which provide 
extensive literature. Many Empirical studied has been conducted, highlighting the issue of 
disclosure on firm performance (Patel el al, 2002, Akhtaruddin, 2005; Attiya, et al., 2012; 
Barako, et al., 2006; Barako, 2007; Ben Ali, 2008; Hossain & Reaz, 2007; Javid & Iqbal, 
2010). Financial performance of the bank and other institution can be measured by using ratio 
analysis, calculating performance against the allotted budget, sometimes by benchmarking or 
by combination of all these methods. (Avkiran, 1995). Most of the literature on bank 
performance describes the financial performance as the mode of earning high profit or return 
by minimizing the risk factor associated with the investment, this is the general relationship 
between the rate of return and interest rate risk which is higher the risk higher the return. 
Henry (2008) and Renders, et al (2010) studies suggested that good corporate governance 
International Letters of Social and Humanistic Sciences Vol. 43 153
  
practices could increase firm value . Dernev, et al (2005) associated a positive link between 
corporate governance and firm performance. In past various studies suggest an number of 
ways through which the corporate governance practices can be translated in to improved firm 
value like in studies by Hermalin, et al (2011). Their study result finding suggest that better 
price performance is associated with firm that have indicators of high disclose quality, having 
outside ownership concentration higher and firm which are focused rather that shows diverse. 
 
2. 1. Corporate Governance & Firm Performance 
Most of the empirical work which have been done on the analyzing the relationship 
between corporate governance and firm performance has been done from single control 
perspective like board size, CEO duality and audit committee. Arslan et al., (2014) examined 
the relationship of audit committee and CEO duality with firm performance by taking ROA 
and ROE as dimensions of firm performance. They argued that there is significant positive 
relationship between audit committee and firm performance while no significant relationship 
of CEO duality and firm performance (Arslan et al., 2014). (Brown & Claylor, 2004) prepared 
governance score with 51 factors and, 8 sub categories for 2327 firms, which were based on 
the institutional shareholder service. The outcome of their study suggested that in those firm 
where governance are more valuable, gains more profitable and ultimately pay more cash to 
the shareholder. On the other hand Gompers,et.al.(2003) classified 24 governance factors into 
five sub categories like voting right, director protection ,tactics for delaying hostile takeover 
,other takeover defenses and state laws. Their finding indicates that firm with fewer 
shareholder rights have low firm value and lower stick return and it also shows that firm with 
stronger shareholder rights have higher firm value, higher profit, high sales growth, lower 
capital expenditure and they made few corporate acquisitions. 
 
2. 2. Board & Management Structure disclosures 
Othman, (2012) study used board and structure process disclosure (BSPD) as corporate 
governance attribute on measuring the level of performance. Their finding suggests that 
BSPD level effect is more on companies from financial sector than from non-financial sector. 
Furthermore BSPD level also act as useful tool for monitoring the board of directors’ 
activities and characteristics. The literature review from the past studies shows that the 
limiting the board size will improve the firm performance. Board and management structure 
involves the disclosure of board size, its composition and disclosure about CEO Duality. 
Florackis, et al (2004) mention in their study that the board size of seven or eight members are 
effective. The larger board size will cause the agency theory conflict in which it is difficult to 
communicate and cost for monitoring and communication will be high in such types of the 
board. On the other hand it is expected that controlling and monitoring the small board size 
reduces the agency cost. The information disclosure is relatively high in small board size. The 
finding of Byard, et al (2006) supports our expectation. They study 1279 firms over two year 
(2001-2002) and they find that disclosure related to forecast information decreases with board 
size. Brown, et al (2004) finding also contributed the literature by analyzing that firm with 
board sizes between 6 and 15 have high ROE and high net profit margins with respect to other 
boards. 
Board composition is very important for effectively monitoring of managers and 
reduction of agency cost (Choe, et al., 2003). There are some advantage of executive directors 
like in shape of skill, relative knowledge and expertise but for the sake of fresh ideas, 
objectivity and independency the role of independent director should be incorporated (Firth et 
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al., 2002; Weir & C, 1997). In addition ,the agency theory also suggest that the non-executive 
director on the board will provide the higher disclosure of various aspect of company. The 
independent board will also lead the management to disclose information increasing 
transparency more than executive members, which highlight the importance of the 
independent board. The finding of (Chen, et al., 2000; Gul, et al., 2004) and Cheng, et al., 
(2006) all support of above expectation regarding independent director and finds that CEO 
duality has the impact on the firm performance. Their finding suggests those firms show 
better performance where the CEO and Chairman of board are separate over the firms having 
one person holding the both position. The separation of board chairman and CEO ultimately 
enhance the information disclosure.    
 
2. 3. Ownership Structure Disclosure 
Agency theory focuses on the importance of ownership structure and its system in order 
to improve the governance. Three perspective of ownership can be sort out in any firm which 
director ownership, block ownership and institutional ownership. When director become 
shareholder the information disclosure will be less because they will not force management to 
disclose information (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Similarly the block owner have different 
proxies at the top management they are well aware of the policies and information and they 
will also not force the management to disclose the information. Therefore a negative 
relationship exists between the director ownership and block ownership with the information 
disclosure. This expectation is also supportive by (Chau, k, et al., 2002; Gompers et al., 2003) 
and (Eng, et al., 2003). Lakha, et al (2005) findings suggest that institutional investor 
relationship with disclosure is positively related since the ownership by institution 
shareholder will monitor the management more than small shareholder. They uses the foreign 
investor in his research as proxy for institutional investor. 
 
2. 4. Financial Transparency and Information Disclosure 
The financial and transparency and disclosure has significant relation with the firm 
performance. Henry, (2008) and Renders, et al (2010) studies suggest that good corporate 
governance practices can increase firm value and Durnev, et al (2005) associated a positive 
link between corporate governance and firm performance. Iatridis, (2008) documented that 
disclosure provided in the annual reports  always result in high profitably and leverage. 
 
2. 5. Corporate Governance in Pakistan 
In recent years corporate governance has become promising area of research. The 
literature supports that corporate governance will ultimately improves the value of the firm. In 
this regard Cheema, (2003) suggest in their research that the good corporate governance can 
play a vital role in the economy of the Pakistan by attracting foreign investment and for 
mobilization of capital in the country. Arslan and Zaman (2014) determined the constraints 
and barriers in corporate governance and managerial efficiency. They documented that 
Pakistan has low ratios of factors like corruption, finance, gender and infrastructure which can 
create the problems. The researchers also suggests that proper implications of corporate 
governance can solve the problems (Arslan & Zaman 2014). In Pakistan the majority of the 
business are family orientated which are acting for profit making. Which argues a greater 
challenge for policy makers to protect the dual objective, the minority shareholder and 
maintain the profit maximizing incentive of family oriented business. In this regard SECP and 
Institute of Chartered Accountant Pakistan as a joint effort launch the first code of corporate 
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governance in early 2002 and make some amendment to tighten the rules, renewed and lunch 
recently in 2012.All the listed companies are required to comply their financial statement and 
procedure with the code. 
 The legal framework for companies is Companies Ordinance 1984, which sets rules 
for governance and regulation of the companies. Banks are regulated by the banking 
ordinance 1962 and SBP prudential issued time to time. The SECP code follows the good 
international practices, including listing rules including disclosure if price, annual general 
meeting. This code bounds companies to inform about the exchange the dividends, capital 
increase and changes in board, the accounting procedure, director remuneration, board 
independence, and other necessary things which are mandatory for disclosure. The State Bank 
of Pakistan (SBP) also mandated the code for all listed or non-listed banks and Development 
Finance Institutes (DFIs) in order to strengthen the shareholder and investor rights. 
 
2. 6. Transparency & Disclosure Index 
The substantive literature review about the phenomena of firm characteristics and T&D 
index is widely included by so many firm characteristics according the financial disclosure 
extent by the compulsory and mandatory obligations. A number of prior studies have 
investigated determinants of companies’ disclosure practices with consistency (Akhtaruddin, 
2005; Attiya, et al., 2012; Barako, et al., 2006; Barako, 2007; Ben Ali, 2008; Hossain & Reaz, 
2007; Javid & Iqbal, 2010a). The studies about the firm characteristics and extent of 
disclosure by (Akhtaruddin & Haron, 2010; Hossain, 2008) used disclosure index with 101 
mandatory item and 83 voluntary disclosure item for investigation of disclosure impact on 
different firm attributes The pragmatic study conducted Sandeep et al. (2002) used the 98 
possible attributes of S&P (Standard & Poor’s) for constructing T&D index for further 
analyzation of T&D score in 19 emerging markets. So disclosure level is subjective 
phenomena and depends up the law and infrastructure of the country under study. In order to 
measure the transparency and disclosure of the firm, the study constructed transparency and 
disclosure index for which the multifactor corporate rating is carried out. The construction of 
index is as follows for each bank there are there are 21 proxies selected in the annual report. 
Which are divided in to three sub categories: The sub categories contain six factors for board 
and management structure, seven for ownership and eight for financial transparency and 
disclosure. The weighting is based on the subjective judgment assigning the number 1 if it is 
complying with that proxy and 0 for not compliance. By taking the average of all sub category 
score we obtain transparency and disclosure index. 
 
 
3.  THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
 
Jensen and Meckling, (1976) define agency relationship as a contract in which one party 
(the principal), gives another part (the agent) decision-making authority to perform some 
services on its behalf. But agency problem arise when each party wants to work for there own 
individual interests and when these interests diverge it creates the problem. Brennan, (1995) 
documented that agency conflict always indulged in creation of agency cost which occur to 
mitigate agency conflict. Ultimately this agency cost will impact on profitability of firm and 
transparency and disclosure. From the prospective of agency theory, problem in transparency 
and disclosure lies with asymmetry of information between managers and stakeholders. 
Agency theory serves on the concept of separation of owner and managers thus creating a 
principal and agent relationship among them (Sharma, 2013). One of the conflicts in agency 
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theory between principal and agent arises due to having different approaches for profit 
maximization. Shareholder intent is to maximize their wealth but managers having more 
information look for the long run. This creates agency problem, which can be minimized by 
disclosing more information. Hossain, (2008) documented that firm having high profitability 
disclose more information than firms having little profit margin 
Past literature of corporate governance revealed that CG can be used for building 
credibility, ensuring the transparency, accountability and keeping an effective source of 
information which should uplift good corporate governance (Patel, Balic, & Bwakira, 
2002).In most of previous studies the dimension to measure the corporate governance  is 
board size, its composition and firm performance but in this study transparency and disclosure  
Index has been incorporated to measure corporate governance corporate. Financial 
performance of the bank is subject of shareholders/stakeholders interest so it can be calculated 
from the return on investment perspective and earnings ratios usually consist of two ratio 
which are ROA (return on asset) & ROE (return on earning). 
 
   
 Independent Variable     Dependent Variable 
 
 
 
 
  
       
                                                                   Control Variable 
 
 
Fig. 1. Theoretical Model. 
(Proposed theoretical model after reviewing literature) 
 
 
3. 1. Hypothesis Development 
 
The literature concludes that disclosing the good corporate governance practices on both 
shareholders and stakeholder impacts positively on firm value (Ntim, et al., 2012). From 
literature concluded the following hypotheses 
H1: Transparency and Disclosure index has positive impact on firm performance in banking 
sector of Pakistan. 
The board and management structure plays a significant role in firm performance. The 
literature review from the past studies shows that the limiting the board size will improve the 
firm performance. Klein, et al. (2005) mention in their study that the board size of seven or 
Transparency and disclosure Index 
 Board and management 
structure disclosure 
 Ownership structure 
disclosure 
 Financial information 
disclosure 
 
Firm Performance 
 Return on Equity 
 
 Return on Assets 
Firm Size 
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eight members are effective. Callahan, et al. (2004) finding suggests that there is positive 
association between board structure and firm performance. So we concluded the following 
hypothesis for board composition and firm performance.    
H2: Board & Management structure disclosure has a positive impact on Firm performance in 
banking sector of Pakistan. 
(Callahan, et al., 2004) documented that corporate governance disclosure practices in 
management decision and its analysis in annual report is associated with current and future 
performance and market valuation. Owner ship structure is negative associated with the firm 
performance because it measures the disclosure of block holder and share ownership of 
management. (Luo et al., 2006) findings suggest the negative association between current 
return and high management ownership concluding the hypothesis 
H3: Ownership structure disclosure has the negative impact on firm performance in banking 
sector of the Pakistan. 
The financial and transparency and disclosure has significant relation with the firm 
performance. Henry, (2008) and Renders, et al. (2010) studies suggest that good corporate 
governance practices can increase firm value and Durnev, et al. (2005) associated a positive 
link between corporate governance and firm performance. Chi, et al. (2008) suggests that 
disclosure practice can reduce information asymmetry which enable shareholder to monitor 
management decision and firm performance resulting the following hypothesis. 
H4: Financial Transparency & Information Disclosure has the positive impact on the 
financial performance in banking sector of the Pakistan 
 
 
4.  RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
4. 1. Sample & Data Collection 
Financial sector for it complex and dynamic environment has attracted regulators and 
investor to keep an eye over its disclosure policies. The core reason behind i on financial 
sector is that it requires extra regulation for efficient working of this industry. The sample 
initially include the all banks operating in Pakistan, but availability of annual report which is 
main source of data gathering in this study was not found. Only sample of 30 banks over the 
period of five years 2007-2011 is used for data collection and empirical analysis.   
 
4. 2. Model specification & Variable measurement 
The following multiple transformed OLS regression model has been used for empirical 
investigation of relationship between T&D Index and firm financial performance. 
 
ROA = β0 + β1 TD_INDEX + β2 F_SIZE + β3 + e 
ROE = β0 + β1 TD_INDEX + β2 F_SIZE + β3 + e 
Transformed OLS multiple regressions have been used for the following subcategories of 
corporate governance disclosure (OSE, FT and BM): 
ROA = β0 + β1 BM + β2 OSE + β3 FT + β4F_SIZE + e 
ROE = β0 + β1 BM + β2 OSE + β3 FT + β4F_SIZE + e 
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 Table 1. Description of Variables. 
 
 
4. 2. 1. Transparency & disclosure Index 
The construction of transparency and disclosure index is subjective in nature as used by 
previous studies (Sandeep et al, 2002; Akhtaruddin & Haron, 2010; Hossain, 2008). T&D 
index construction involves total 21 proxies selected from the annual reports, which are 
divided in to three sub categories: The sub categories contain six factors for board and 
management structure, seven for ownership and eight for financial transparency and 
disclosure. The weighting is based on the subjective judgment assigning the number 1 if it is 
complying with that proxy and 0 for not compliance. By taking the average of all sub category 
score we obtain transparency and disclosure index. 
 
 
5.  EMPIRICAL RESULT & FINDINGS 
5. 1. Descriptive Statics 
The transparency and disclosure level of present banking sector in Pakistan has 
analyzed using the checklist of 21 disclosure items. Table 2 shows the descriptive analysis of 
variables incorporated in the study. The sample of 30 banks over the period of five year has 
employed in the study so the total number of observation remains 150. By analyzing the 
Transparency and disclosure in table below, depicts the minimum and maximum level of 
banks is 48 % and 95 % respectively. The average result of overall disclosure is 79 %, which 
is quite impressive, while looking the governance infrastructure of the country. Board 
management and ownership structural disclosure is also more than 85 %. The average score 
for ownership structure disclosure is quite low (63 %) while comparing other sub categories 
and this score confirm the notion of the Pakistani companies structure as family oriented. 
Similarly the average score depicts that 11.5 % assets in the Pakistani companies are held 
with banking sector.  
Abbreviated Name Full Name Data Source Measurement 
Dependent Variables 
 
ROA Return on Asset Annual Report Net income/Total Assets 
ROE Return on Equity Annual Report 
Net Profit / Shareholders 
fund 
Independent Variables 
 
TD_INDEX 
Overall Transparency & 
Disclosure Index 
Annual Report (Dichotomies 1, 0) 
OSE 
Ownership structure 
disclosure 
Annual Report (Dichotomies 1, 0) 
FT 
Financial information 
disclosure 
Annual Report (Dichotomies 1, 0) 
BM 
Board & management 
structure disclosure 
Annual Report (Dichotomies 1, 0) 
Control Variables 
 
F_SIZE Firm Size Annual Report Log of Total Assets 
International Letters of Social and Humanistic Sciences Vol. 43 159
  
Table 2. Descriptive Statistics of Variables. 
Variable N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. dev 
Dependent Variables 
     
ROA 150 -10 4 0.53 2.29 
ROE 150 -199 29 -0.33 7.89 
Independent Variables 
     
TD_INDEX 150 48 95 79.22 10.75 
OSE 150 29 100 63.89 11.67 
FT 150 50 100 87.5 13.15 
BM 150 67 100 86.23 11.55 
Control Variables 
     
F_SIZE 150 8 12 11.15 0.839 
 
5. 2. Correlation Analysis 
Table 3 shows the correlation analysis between explanatory and dependent variables. 
The correlation matrix between T&D index and firm performance variables (ROA & ROE) 
shows the significant positive relationship with each other (r = 0.49 & 0.45), It depicts that 
firms having high transparency and disclosure level have also enjoy the high profit. Similarly 
board and management disclosure and financial information transparency disclosure, two sub 
clauses of T&D Index is also positively related to financial performance. Ownership structural 
disclosure, sub clause of T&D index is negatively associated with financial performance in 
the context of Pakistani banking industry due to family oriented ownership structure of 
majorities of firms in Pakistan.  
 
Table 3. Pearson correlation matrix (N = 150). 
Variable ROA ROE TD_INDEX OSE FT BM F_SIZE 
ROA 1.00 0.70 0.49 -0.18 0.31 0.15 0.44 
ROE 0.70 1.00 0.45 -0.02 0.21 0.22 0.43 
TD_INDEX 0.49 0.45 1.00 0.83 0.85 0.47 0.34 
OSE -0.18 -0.02 0.83 1.00 0.52 0.72 0.28 
FT 0.31 0.21 0.85 0.52 1.00 0.41 -0.11 
BM 0.15 0.22 0.47 0.72 0.41 1.00 0.02 
F_SIZE 0.44 0.43 0.34 0.28 -0.11 0.02 1,00 
 
5. 3. Regression Result 
OLS Regression results shown in table 4 states that transparency and disclosure index is 
significant positive related to the indicators of firm performance that are return on assert 
160 Volume 43
  
(ROA) and return on equity (ROE). The value of F-test shows that the model is best fit to data 
and Durbin Watson statistics shows that there are not significant serial correlation are present 
among the variables. According to confidence interval approach the t-value and p-value 
stratifying the relationship between ROA, ROE and T&D index are at significant level (t = 
2.295 & P-value = 0.0054) which support the first hypothesis of study (H1) that there is 
positive relationship between transparency & disclosure and firm financial performance. Our 
result regarding T&D and firm performance are supported by previous studies. (Owusu & 
Yeoh, 2005 & Ntim, et al., 2012). 
Table 4 also shows the econometric result of relationship of three sub level of 
transparency and disclosure with firm performance. By analyzing the result for board 
management structure process disclosure with firm financial performance indicators (ROA & 
ROE), it is observed that all statistical values (t = 2.105 & P = 0.0051) are documenting 
positive relationship among them. So our second proposed hypothesis (H2) has accepted that 
there exist, positive relationship between board & management structure disclosure and 
financial performance supported by the studies conducted by Florackis and Ozkan (2004)  and 
Klein, et al. (2005). 
For the relationship between ownership structure disclosure and firm financial 
performance (H3) indicators, there exists a negative relationship between them. The 
confidence interval value of t-statistics (t = -2.47 & -3.82) and probability statistics (P = 0.009 
& 0.004) confirmed the significant negative relation between ownership structure disclosure 
and ROA and ROE respectively. The negative relations between these variables also depict 
the notion that companies often not willing to disclose the proper information about major 
owners/shareholders or most firms in Pakistan are family oriented. These statistical result are 
in line with the studies conducted by as Callahan, et al. (2004) and Luo, et al. (2006), in 
which they documented negative relationship between ownership structure and firm 
performance. 
In terms of financial information disclosure, the regression results listed in table 4 
support the proposed hypothesis (H4) that financial information disclosure a (sub level of 
T&D) is significant positive related to the firm financial performance when size is taken as 
control variables. The coefficient estimate is significant to ROA and ROE at 1 % significant 
level. Henry, (2008) and Renders, et al. (2010) also documented in their studies that 
companies disclosing more information in their annual reports will enhance their shareholder 
confidence and ultimately this will impact upon their performance. In relation to our control 
variable of the study, table 4 result reveals that firm size is an important predator of the firm 
profitability. Larger firm willing to disclose more information as they are regularly watched 
and monitored by regulators and ultimately enjoy the benefits of these disclosure by 
establishing trust/confidence of customers and shareholders in terms of profitability.  
 
Table 4. Ordinary least squares (OLS) regression results of Transparency & Disclosure scores on test 
& Control variables (N = 150). 
Dependent 
Variable 
Return on Assets (ROA) Return on Equity (ROE) 
Adjusted R² 57.69% 28.02% 
F-Value 15.12 6.34 
P-value 0.0046*** 0.003*** 
Durbin Watson 
Stat 
1.88 1.74 
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Parameters 
Coeff. 
Est 
t-statistics P-Value 
Coeff. 
Estd. 
t-statistics P-Value 
Intercept Included 
  
Included 
 
 
H1TD_INDEX 0.42 2.295 0.0054*** 0.39 2.149 0.0044*** 
H2-BM 0.46 2.105 0.0051 0.41 2.002 0.0069 
H3-OSE -0.984 -2.476 0.0009*** -1.02 -3.82 0.004*** 
H4-FT 11.95 2.639 0.0097*** 8.07 2.01 0.002*** 
F_SIZE 
(Control) 
0.31 3.591 0.028** 0.28 2.915 0.0417** 
   Shows significance level *** at 1%,  ** at 5%, and ** at 10% 
 
 
6.  CONCLUSIONS 
 
Transparency and disclosure coupled with firm performance has been largely studied on 
developed economy but very few studies were conducted on the developing countries 
especially Pakistan where the corporate governance infrastructure is in transformation phase 
after Security Exchange Commission of Pakistan launched its code of corporate governance 
in 2002 and revised it in 2012 for betterment of governance level in Pakistan. The reason 
behind the sample related to financial sectors is due to its sensitive nature and second most of 
economy revolves around this sector. The purpose of this research paper is to determine the 
level of disclosure and its impact on financial performance on banking system. The 
construction of T&D index in the paper involves the multifactor corporate rating, based on the 
annual reports of banks operating in Pakistan. Furthermore index follows 21 disclosure 
proxies taken from literature, divided in to three sub categories which are board & ownership 
structure disclosure, ownership structure disclosure and financial information OLS 
transformed regression has employed on the sample of 30 banks over the period of five year 
(2007-2011). 
Finding of the paper reveals that T&D index along with its two sub level is significantly 
positively related to the financial performance indicators (ROA & ROE) except ownership 
structure disclosure which is negative related to the ROA & ROE and finally the average level 
of disclosure is at higher side for Pakistani banking industry. 
The current research paper aims for important policy implementation to reduce 
information asymmetry and improve corporate governance and firm performance in banking 
sector of Pakistan High level of transparency and disclosure can be used as trust improvement 
tool in order to maximize the worth of the organization. This study suggests that minimum 
disclosure level of the company should be above requirement of regulator in order to cope 
disclosure benefits. The research paper also poses some limitation. First is regarding sample 
size, which is small due to availability of data and time constraint. Second limitation is 
regarding the construction of transparency and disclosure index due to its subjective nature 
and data presented by companies in their annual reports may have some questions. 
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Appendix 1 
Transparency & Disclosure Index (T&DI) Components 
Sub Index 1: Board & Management Structure Disclosure 
(i) Board size 
(ii)      Board composition 
(iii)     CEO and Chairman Separation 
(iv)     Independent Director in the board 
(v)      Existing of position of CFO 
(vi)     AGM 
 
 
 
Sub Index 2: Ownership Structure Disclosure 
(i) Does CEO owns share 
(ii) Director ownership other than CEO & chairman 
(iii) Chairman & CEO is block ownership(more than 10 % shareholding) 
(iv) Concentration of ownership(Top five) 
(v) Outside Block holder 
(vi) Dividend Policy 
(vii) Staff benefits other than wages & Salaries 
 
International Letters of Social and Humanistic Sciences Vol. 43 165
  
Sub Index 3: Financial Transparency and Information Disclosure 
(i) Does company having full disclosure of CG practices 
(ii) Does the company discloses how much it pays to auditor for consulting and other 
work 
(iii) Does the company disclose full biography of its board members 
(iv) Disclosure of director and executive staff remuneration 
(v) Disclosure of share ownership according to the requirement of code 
(vi) Employee ownership (executive management staff member) 
(vii) Disclosure of internal audit committee 
(viii) Accounting policies  
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